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James Franklin, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before Pascal, Johns
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2002. xiii + 497 pp. ISBN 0-8018-7109-3 (Paperback). U.S.
$22.50.
One of the mathematical highlights of 17th-century Europe was the mathematization of probability.
It is an oft-told and fairly well documented story involving some of mathematics’ best-known figures,
including Fermat, Pascal, and Huygens. Of course, this event did not occur without prelude or context.
James Franklin’s formidable book takes as its broad mission to explain what came before the mathema-
tization of probability, and, incidentally, to explain the apparent coincidence that so very many of the
founders of mathematical probability had legal experience or training.
This book has already been reviewed several times, including by The Wall Street Journal, by Quad-
rant, an Australian literary review, and by a couple of publications on science news. All the reviews are
glowing. The Wall Street Journal tells us “This is not a book for sissies.” Quadrant calls it a “wonderful
book.” Another review, written by a former colleague of the author at the University of New South Wales,
proclaims it “the intellectual book of the year.” All agree with the present reviewer that this is, indeed, an
excellent book, meticulously researched (over 1500 notes), and sprinkled with a wry, sometimes cynical
wit. The various reviewers do not agree, however, on what the virtues of the book are. It seems to be a
very different book to different readers.
Roger Kimball writes for The Wall Street Journal, “ ‘The Science of Conjecture’ provides a his-
tory of the rational techniques that mankind has developed to acquire knowledge when certainty is not
available—which is most of the time.” By contrast, in Science’s Compass, Jane Hawkins writes that
Franklin “argues convincingly that evaluations of certainty involve moral and philosophical issues not
relevant in math, and likewise mathematical certainty is not required in law or religion.” Her review is
filled with ways the evaluation of uncertainty could be used in pursuing those who planned the Sep-
tember 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Such applications are irrelevant to the
contents of the book, as they are forensic and investigative. Franklin’s book deals with the presentation
and evaluation of evidence, not with its discovery.
On the other hand, Josephine Kelly, writing in Quadrant, tells us that “The writer looks at how the
principles of probability have come to be understood and applied over their history by tracing their de-
velopment through the disciplines of law, moral theology, rhetoric, science, religion, ‘aleatory contracts’
(insurance, annuities and bets) and finally dice.” Despite a curious complaint that the author does not
use enough hyphens, Kelly’s interpretation of the book is more in accord with this reviewer’s views than
any of the others. However, she does not seem to be as moved by Franklin’s argument that Pascal’s anddoi:10.1016/j.hm.2004.11.005
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than in questions of frequency or probability in the modern sense of the word. We will return to this issue
later.
Our story begins in ancient times with a survey of legal standards of proof in Egypt, Mesopotamia,
India, and Rome and in Jewish law. This is followed by two chapters on the Middle Ages and the Re-
naissance, when they used something called Roman law. A thousand years had passed, so of course the
Roman law of the Renaissance only resembled the Roman law of ancient Rome. For example, a kind of
calculus of testimonial evidence evolved. In instances that required testimony of two witnesses to deter-
mine truth, if there were only one witness, the result was a “half-proof.” Controversy naturally erupted.
Could there be “quarter-proofs?” Do two half-proofs make a whole proof?
Eventually, a whole range of degrees of proof arose, with names like suspicion, presumption, conjec-
ture, and violent support, each with its own properties and qualities, and each carrying its own weight
in court. Rules evolved, such as “three witnesses might defeat a document.” Certain kinds of witnesses
were more credible than others, while certain defendants, especially high clergy, required more witnesses
than others in order to be convicted. Some kinds of testimony had to be “confirmed” by torture, which,
it seems, was not supposed to be used as part of a punishment, but rather as part of the investigation
process.
The rules of evidence were particularly rigorous where the Inquisition was strong, especially Spain
and Italy. Franklin notes that the abuses of the laws of evidence that led to the prosecution of witches
in other parts of Europe and in early America were much less common under the Inquisition and may
explain why there was comparatively little witch hysteria in Spain and Italy.
During the 15th century, English law diverged more and more from Continental law. In England, there
was the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof was based on convincing a jury of “reason-
able men.” It took until about 1800 to articulate the now-familiar formula “proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Throughout, though, the word “probable” meant something like “able to be proved in court,” and
“probability” described whether or not there might be the means of providing a proof. At other times,
“probable” was the opposite of “hidden,” and at still other times it was the degree of proof attached to
the testimony of witnesses. It was not something to be measured, and the people who used it would not
have thought of doing calculations with probability, nor was it related to any measure of the frequency
with which an outcome might be expected to occur if an action were repeated many times.
Probability contrasts with doubt, which is, more or less, the likelihood that something that is probable
might be false. It should be understood that though words such as “probability” and “doubt” were techni-
cal legal terms and were carefully defined many times, those definitions were quite different in different
places and periods, and few of the definitions have anything approaching a modern standard of rigor.
The short descriptions of the meanings of words given here must necessarily fall far short of the richness
and diversity of the meaning the words actually had. To fully appreciate what has only been summarized
briefly here is one of many good reasons to read the 400 pages of the book itself rather than the two or
three pages of this review.
In a chapter on moral certainty, we learn how the invention, in the 12th century, of the Catholic sacra-
ment of confession “made canon law part of the life of every person in Western Europe” and that it is no
coincidence that the word “confession” is both the name of the sacrament and the name of the testimony
a suspect gives of his or her own guilt.
Around the same time, a doctrine of moral safety called “tutiorism” arose. This principle contrasted
with principles of moral certainty in that it recommended selecting the safer alternative, when presented
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aversive.” This was the environment in which arose the first versions of Pascal’s “proof” that a reasonable
person should pray. The risks of not praying, eternal damnation should God exist, make praying the
far safer alternative. Neither the tutiorists nor Pascal 400 years later attempted to attach any numerical
probability to the likelihood that God exists.
Rigorous deductive proofs were highly valued but very rare. However, we are treated to the story of a
Spanish writer, Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz, who, “after a career as a child genius” wrote Mathesis Audax
of 1642, “in which he claims to have resolved the major problems of logic, physics, and theology, espe-
cially those touching grace and free will, by ruler and compass construction.” The doctrine of tutiorism
would have us all rushing to the rare book rooms to check Caramuel’s proof, for though it is highly likely
that his analysis contains a flaw, the benefits, if it is correct, would be enormous.
We move on to the problems of finding proofs in hard science. In the 14th century, Oresme made the
first connection between frequency and probability, but his ideas there were mostly ignored. He used
irrational numbers to refute the principles of astrology, an idea hardly more outrageous than Caramuel’s
geometric proof. We also touch Kepler, Copernicus, and Galileo and their standards of scientific evidence.
For a historian of science, this chapter is too short.
Hard science is followed by soft science, divination, astrology, drug testing, biology, quality control,
and other fields where knowledge was fueled primarily by authority and empirical evidence. At times,
the historian of mathematics might lose the thread of Franklin’s thesis in a tangle of law, philosophy,
and religion, though readers from other backgrounds might well follow those arguments most clearly.
Eventually, though, as in good classical music, the original theme begins to re-emerge, and we see that it
has really been there all along.
For historians of mathematics, the thread re-emerges in Chapter 10, on aleatory contracts. These began
as business transactions in which the price must incorporate risks and expectations. Franklin traces such
contracts to classical Greek times and so-called maritime loans. He recounts a loan to a ship owner, priced
at 22.5% interest, but which did not have to be repaid if the ship were lost. The price clearly reflects both
the lender’s expectation of a return on his investment and the risk that the entire investment would be
lost. We also get fascinating accounts of the birth and evolution of insurance and life annuities and how
they evolved into bets and lotteries.
What gradually emerges in Franklin’s analysis is that the prices for aleatory contracts, at least through
the 17th century, were based on the idea of fairness rather than on an idea of frequency-based probability.
A typical problem cited deals with the partition of profits in a partnership, and giving a fair accounting
of the additional risk that one partner may have endured.
When we move on to Chapter 11, “Dice,” we find that the theory again deals with fairness and not
with frequency. Typical problems deal with the fair division of stakes in an interrupted game, as with the
“problem of points,” famously discussed by Pascal and Fermat. Similar problems occur as early as the
13th century.
Franklin makes much of Cardano’s 16th-century efforts in the analysis of gambling. Cardano gave a
brief and flawed analysis of the fair division of stakes in his Practica Arithmetica of 1539 and a much
longer and more confusing analysis in an undated manuscript De Ludo Aleae, not published until 1663,
by which time Pascal, Fermat, and Huygens had made Cardano’s ideas obsolete. Franklin has trouble
reconciling Cardano’s analysis in other works with his confusing and often self-contradictory discourse
in De Ludo Aleae. In a private communication to this reviewer, David Bellhouse reports that he has
written an article for this journal, to appear soon, based in part on this particular passage in Franklin’s
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coherent and connected argument about games of chance, with both sides of a difficult and controversial
issue presented, structured very much like a legal argument. The confusion arises, according to Bellhouse,
because it is not always clear which side of the legal argument is being voiced. The point of mentioning
Bellhouse’s work is that it shows that Franklin’s key idea—that the origins of probability theory lie in the
law—is already bearing fruit and helping to illuminate things that had been confusing.
Chapter 11 continues, recounting the contributions of most of the major contributors, Pascal, Fermat,
Cardano, Pacioli, De Méré, Roberval, Huygens, and our recent acquaintance Juan Caramuel, and how
each contribution is related or grounded in the legal thinking of the time. It is a masterful climax to the
book and a worthy reward for the reader who struggled in the chapters on medieval and canon law.
The author indulges himself with a moral to his story, warning of “[t]he cost of repeating those errors,
in those reaches of the humanities that have traded in their birthright of rationality for a mess of post-
modernist pottage. . . .” However, this reviewer found the final chapter to drag somewhat, dwelling too
long on the question of why mathematical probability had not been discovered earlier and on how the
same legally influenced modes of thinking that shaped the origins of probability may also have affected
thought in economics, psychology, linguistics, and so on.
In sum, this is a comprehensively researched and referenced book (an average of 4.1 notes per page),
riddled with witty and often irreverent comments. It makes a significant point about the relation between
mathematical and legal thinking. It is well worth the substantial time and effort to read it, and David
Bellhouse’s work will not be the last to find nourishment in its pages.
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